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Abstract 
Post-conflict transformation is a difficult task, since renewed violence 
frequently flares up after peace treaties have been signed. Failure to end conflict 
often results from misinterpretations of the roots or an inability of the conflict to 
create suitable exit strategies for military forces. Reintegration of soldiers and non-
state armed actors entails delicate and complex procedures, which are central in 
maintaining security in a newly created democracy. These all point to the important 
role of the military in post-conflict transformation. The focus of the study on which 
this article is based, was on evaluating the role and place of military forces in post-
conflict peace-building activities. These activities relate to diverse peacekeeping 
experiences in Africa, and focused on flaws and challenges in post-conflict peace-
building missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and the Central 
African Republic; post-conflict transformation and development; security sector 
reform; and South Africa’s participation as member of the Southern African 
Development Community. 
Key words: external, internal military forces, post-conflict peace-building, security 
sector reform, SADC participation.  
Introduction 
Peacekeeping is a 50-year-old United Nations (UN) initiative that has 
grown swiftly in Africa over the past two decades from a traditional, mainly 
military model of observing ceasefires and 
force separations after intrastate wars to 
integrate a complex model of military and 
civilian participation in peace-building in the 
unsafe after-effects of civil wars. 
Peacekeeping is intended to support the policy 
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and maintenance of situations favouring long-term conflict resolution and peace-
building.1 A complex peace operation implies joining peacekeeping with peace-
building, which relates to “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to 
reassemble the foundations of peace and [build] … something that is more than just 
the absence of war”.2 
Military officers in peace-building efforts are enlisted personnel from 
different services and countries, participating with multinational agents of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), international civil servants and individual 
diplomats, all having diverse institutional backgrounds. 3  Depending on the 
mandate of the mission authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC), military 
officers serve in electoral, UN police and human rights groups and in delegations 
from UN programmes and agencies. UN missions are linked to regional 
organisations and alliances, prominently the African Union (AU) and sub-regional 
organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with 
their member states, as well as the European Union (EU). The number of agencies 
participating in multidimensional missions has greatly expanded owing to the 
increase in operational goals, now including human security principles through 
state-building, government-sector reform and peace-building. The asymmetric 
context of operations is becoming increasingly complex, mostly in situations with 
high levels of enduring conflict and volatility. 4  Peacekeepers are thrust into 
complex and dangerous tasks, such as weapons control, roadblocks and attacks on 
military patrols, refugee relief work, post-conflict reconstruction and election 
certification. These unconventional, asymmetric roles are not the preserve of the 
military, and are turning soldiers from trained warriors into peacekeepers deployed 
by a Chapter VII UNSC mandate.  
Peacekeepers are required to have sound understanding of and appreciation 
for cultural diversities and different norms and traditions of host societies, and to 
demonstrate extraordinary carefulness, self-control and insight into other cultures, 
to avoid reflecting poorly on the UN mission. Intercultural factors are significant, 
as most conflicts stem from religion and ethnicity, as reported through interviews 
of 94 returning South African National Defence Force (SANDF) peacekeepers 
participating in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Burundi. 5  Post-conflict reconstruction projects often fail owing to insufficient 
cultural knowledge, which can aggravate negative public opinion and hostility 
towards peacekeepers.6 Irrespective of how many training courses peacekeepers 
may have attended, the reality of applying human security principles in 
unconventional, asymmetric conflict is far removed from the mentality of some 
African militaries, also at command levels.7 UN peacekeeping and post-conflict 
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peace-building are demanding, dangerous tasks as were proved by Heinecken and 
Ferreira8 in an in-depth qualitative research project employing questionnaires on 
the operational experiences of 94 SANDF peacekeepers.  
Heinecken and Ferreira’s main research question centred on the role and 
place of military forces in post-conflict peace-building activities. The study aimed 
to evaluate these roles and the place of forces by scrutinising peacekeeping 
experiences, flaws and challenges in post-conflict peace-building missions in the 
DRC, Burundi and Sudan, post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) 
and security sector reform. Military forces have vital roles to play in the eventual 
success of post-conflict peace-building. External militaries or peacekeepers have to 
create a security environment in which peace-building efforts can prosper and 
prevent internal forces from damaging the fragile stability created in post-conflict 
situations. Internal, national forces must be under democratic civil control and be 
restructured and retrained to become assets, not liabilities, in the long-term peace-
building process. The roles of external militaries (peacekeeping/peace-building), 
those of internal forces (national security sector reform) and the interaction of these 
forces are important.9 The value of security sector reform for national, regional and 
international security is esteemed by security aides and recipient societies, although 
recipients are sceptical about the conditions for improvement and about external 
actors imposing their own institutional and structural preferences in post-conflict 
transition, since earlier programmes were often ill-conceived and poorly 
implemented.10 
Regional economic communities (RECs), such as the SADC and 
ECOWAS, developed in Africa as important participants and economic focal 
points in PCRD processes, but challenges are experienced in implementing 
strategies, as peace and security activities remain limited. The role the South 
African government could play in PCRD through the SANDF is explored here, 
since its declared foreign policy is to lead in multilateral forums to solve problems 
regarding the international community, including the SADC.11  
Post-Conflict Transformation and Development 
After 17 years of almost continual conflict in the DRC, causing 2,5 million 
internally displaced people to flee their homes, post-conflict transformation is yet 
to be addressed. Originally, people directly concerned in violent conflict had to 
bear the consequences and the burden of PCRD primarily on their own, but a new 
human security debate on principles and insights emerged in the 1990s, discussing 
security threats emanating from five sectors: military, political, economic, social 
and environmental. The UN portrayed human security as a people-centred 
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approach (rather than state-centred), describing the most basic components as 
‘freedom from fear and want’, and asserting that it should offer safety from chronic 
threats, such as hunger, disease and political repression.12 An all-encompassing, 
holistic approach to the security of citizens was propagated to ensure stability in 
society, based on a functionalist theoretical perspective. The main premise is that 
military matters of institutional nature are regarded as organised systems of 
activities directed to reach specific goals or fulfil manifest functions (post-conflict 
transformation and development) in order to maintain stability and for the survival 
of the greater societal system. A definite link was made between human security, 
transformation and development, focusing on the termination of war and the 
rebuilding of post-war societies as crucial for transformation.  
Terminating violence has failed repeatedly for reasons ranging from 
misinterpretation of the roots of the conflict to an inability to find suitable exit 
strategies for multinational peacekeepers from troop-contributing countries, 
enabling peacekeepers not to withdraw prematurely, but to stay for the duration of 
the PCRD project to achieve successful transformation. Former UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced the concept of post-conflict peace-
building in his 1992 Agenda for Peace, as an important step in the sequence of 
preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping. 13  According to another 
former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, post-conflict peace-building refers to 
actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to strengthen and consolidate peace and 
prevent a recurrence of armed conflict. Experience has shown that consolidation of 
peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military 
action. An integrated peace-building effort is needed as part of the many factors 
constituting post-conflict transformation. The UN Agenda for Peace has been 
proved insufficient for meeting humanitarian and security imperatives. The need to 
realign humanitarian interventions with military peacekeeping was 
acknowledged.14 The UN tasked the Brahimi Panel to estimate the inadequacies in 
order to endorse change, and in August 2000, the Brahimi Report deliberated the 
state of UN peace operations, the shortcomings and enduring failures. 
Recommendations were made to align humanitarian interventions and to employ 
larger, well-resourced military forces with clear, credible and achievable mandates 
and specific authority to use force as a deterrent, while accepting the risk of 
operational casualties.15 Although it emphasised that the UN “does not wage war”, 
the reality of robust peacekeeping is such that the UN now finds itself in situations 
where it must take vigorous action to protect civilians, such as in the DRC in 2013. 
For the first time in the 65-year history of UN missions, an offensive mandate was 
granted. The responsibility to protect became the task of the military, while states 
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ceded their sovereignty to protect civilians to military forces to prevent, react and 
rebuild.  
On 28 March 2013, the UNSC (Resolution 2098) granted the Force 
Intervention Brigade (FIB) an unprecedented Chapter VII mandate by authorising 
targeted offensive operations allowing “neutralisation of armed groups in the east 
of the DRC”,16 specifying the elimination of the entrenched rebel movement, M23, 
and the protection of civilians from rebel forces in eastern DRC.  
Post-conflict peace-building is a multidimensional, political process of 
transformation from violent conflict to stability and peace, needing “a multifaceted 
approach, covering diplomatic, political and economic factors”. 17  Suitable 
measures and timetables are essential, including exit strategies for the military to 
ensure sustainability. This converts into a particularly difficult and awkward 
undertaking, since peace-building does not replace ongoing humanitarian and 
development activities in countries emerging from crisis. It aims rather to build, 
add and orientate activities designed to decrease the risk of enduring conflict and to 
create conditions facilitating reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery. The 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty states that the 
durable goal of international actors in post-conflict situations is ‘to do themselves 
out of a job’ by establishing political procedures, requiring local actors to continue 
commitments for rebuilding societies, and creating participation between hostile 
groups.18 
In peace-building, intervening militaries operate in a milieu of fragile peace 
and order. They are confronted by local militaries and paramilitaries still to be 
integrated into post-conflict societies after months or years of engagement in 
violent struggles against each other and against the civilian population. External 
and national militaries are expected to unite to establish sustainable peace in the 
unstable environment. A dual transformation process is required, since external 
militaries of troop-contributing countries must meet the new challenges of 
peacekeeping, support and peace-building tasks, while internal militaries, 
paramilitaries and police forces must be transformed and integrated into 
acceptable, legitimate and democratic security structures. Relationships supporting 
an environment enabling broader, sustainable peace-building performance are 
challenging.19  
Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Security Sector Reform 
Effective peace-building needs in-depth reform of society’s security sector, 
requiring active involvement of military, economic and political actors. The 
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security sector includes all organisations that have the authority to use force, or to 
order the use thereof, to protect the state, its citizens and civil structures 
accountable for management and oversight. Security reform supports peace-
building, focusing on military assistance and civilian partners in peace operations. 
The guidelines on reform define the wider security system, involving actors, roles 
and duties to manage the system through democratic norms and wide-ranging 
principles of good governance, supporting a well-functioning security framework 
through the following key role players:20  
 Core security actors are firstly the armed forces, which comprised of 
the military, police, paramilitaries, presidential guards, intelligence and 
security services, coastguards, customs authorities, and local security 
units.  
 Security management and oversight bodies comprised of the executive 
and legislative select committees, defence ministries, internal and foreign 
affairs, customary authorities, financial ministries, audit and planning 
units, review boards and public grievances commissions. 
 Justice and law enforcement institutions comprised of the judiciary, 
justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution 
services, human rights commissions and ombudsmen, customary and 
traditional justice systems.  
The socio-economic, governance and security dimensions of a fragile 
environment are mutually reinforced by cooperating internal and external actors, 
leading to an integrated approach to development of conflict resolution and 
prevention within the multidimensional, political, economic and societal 
framework of PCRD.  
Role of the Military in Peace-Building Missions 
Since the 1990s, most brutal conflicts have occurred in Africa. Despite 
some 20 peace-building operations in Africa over the past 25 years, there is still no 
cohesive strategy to target key areas in rebuilding war-torn countries. Conflict 
transformation, referring to long peace-making and peace-building processes, is 
difficult, as renewed violence breaks out regularly between governments and non-
state actors, despite peace accords. Militaries regularly play political roles in peace 
negotiations, reintegration of soldiers, contact with non-state actors and application 
of human security principles in post-conflict political transition, but they often 
withdraw once peace negotiations have started or the state has won a military 
victory.  
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It is clear that a military approach to peace missions needs to include 
developmental, economic and governance support to ensure lasting stability and 
human security. Armed forces must be equipped and trained for these multiple 
roles, which were previously regarded as secondary functions, but are now 
priorities in humanitarian peace missions. The South African Army’s strategy for 
PCRD in Africa, developed and based on the 2006 AU PCRD Needs Assessment 
Guide, is used as a parameter together with South African policy imperatives to 
integrate development projects and peace missions involving military and civilian 
organisations. 21  Particular processes are required to develop a sustainable and 
cohesive PCRD strategy in the African environment. 
As implied, the roles of external and internal military forces and the 
process of security sector reform are key elements of PCRD, including the 
rebuilding of political institutions, security and economic structures. External 
military forces must be ready to cope with diverse tasks, such as reinstatement of 
order, support for local forces, disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and 
reintegration (DDRR) of fighters, facilitation of security sector reform, monitoring 
of elections, demining, securing the repatriation of refugees and protection of 
human rights. DDRR processes of ex-combatants and child soldiers must be 
prioritised, including skills training and long-term reform programmes to ensure 
security for them and their families. Proliferation of small arms must be limited by 
collecting arms, initiating buy-back programmes and enhanced internal control to 
avoid the distribution of weapons and a return to violence. Actions of external 
militaries must serve as integral parts of the overall transformation of the specific 
post-conflict society. 
In most post-conflict societies, political institutions are absent or greatly 
weakened. While there is an excess of war ordnance and weaponry, there is little or 
no civil control over military and police forces, and mistrust and economic scarcity 
determine political and social relations. The gradual formation of democratic and 
legitimate state institutions and a functioning civil society is key in establishing 
stability, as are efforts to ensure that civil-military relations are restructured and 
based on democratic principles for military and police forces to enhance, not 
threaten, the security of the state and society. The military as a state institution is 
primarily an instrument to guarantee external security for the state and society and 
takes its orders from the state (civis), called ‘state or civil control’ over the 
military. Although the term ‘civilian control’ is frequently used, Chuter22 questions 
it and is not in favour of using it, since the term ‘civilian control’ “is an accident of 
language rather than anything else”. As a term, it adds little clarity, and should 
rather be discarded, since the military takes orders from the democratically elected 
state, or civis.23 ‘Civil control’ refers to the obedience and loyalty the military owes 
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the civis, the state. The military upholds order by advising on the formulation of 
defence policy and by serving to implement it. It so happens that the individual 
personalities to whom the military has this civic duty, such as the responsible 
Cabinet Minister and the President, are civilians. According to Chuter, 24  if 
anything is wrong with civil-military relations, it is because the military is not 
prepared to acknowledge this partnership and does not adhere to orders. The 
minimisation of the power of the military through civil control is not the only issue 
of interest in civil-military relations, because the military has an important role to 
play in the institutionalisation of human security and humanitarian peace 
missions.25  
Internal security structures and militaries tend to lack civil and democratic 
control, cohesion, proficiency and public credibility. The relational goals between 
civilians and the military are that civilians make policy decisions, but do not 
interfere in military matters, and the military does not intrude on civilian 
supremacy. In Africa, however, non-state actors, like donors and militaries, mostly 
operate in undemocratic governments, but there is “not necessarily a good 
relationship between the military and civilians”.26 In African countries, it is not 
generally recognised that the military is subordinate to the polity. The opinion 
about civil-military relations is that countries are either undemocratic, or 
democratic governance is explicitly used to avoid civil-military relations.27  
External militaries, regional organisations and the UN can be of assistance 
in restructuring and retraining post-conflict militaries by creating a security milieu, 
preventing dissidents from obstructing the delicate peace-building process and 
aiding reform. Positive security reform ensures that weak states do not revert to 
violence, but rather unite responsible governance between local stakeholders and 
international donor communities to ensure reform efforts. According to Karuru,28 
Africa is unable to build its peace and security programmes without the assistance 
of donor organisations, such as the UN and its affiliates. The African Standby 
Force (ASF) constitutes military personnel from diverse countries, cooperating 
with difficulty, because of cultural and language issues. These forces are mostly 
trained by private security companies paid by international donors, raising 
questions regarding cohesiveness and possible deficiencies of training. Karuru29 
suggests that relevant rules of engagement and ethics be held by related donor 
associations, since they have become indispensable non-state actors in missions. 
However, the operationalization of the five brigades of the ASF is fraught with 
problems. These are the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) in West Africa, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) in southern Africa, the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS) in central Africa, the Eastern Africa Standby Force 
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(EASF) in the east, and the North African Regional Capability (NARC) in the 
north. The primary task of these brigades is to train and keep the 25 000 troops 
ready for service at any time. The challenges the AU faces in 2017 are very 
different from the period in 2003/2004 when the ASF was conceptualized. Cedric 
de Coning states in an interview with Lesley Connolly of the Global Peace 
Operations Review on 29 February 2016 that “African peace operations are unique, 
and not just deficient UN peace operations. Africa does not need saviours, but 
partners…Those that still base their relationship with the AU around capacity-
building and development need to adapt to the fact that any relationship with the 
AU today should be about strategic partnership.” 30  
The ASF is a capacity-building tool, but is unlikely to deploy a regional 
brigade. However, should that happen, the ASF structures need to adapt to that 
specific role.31 Unsatisfied by the slow progress of the ASF, a number of West 
African states set up an equivalent crisis resolution mechanism in 2012, called the 
African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) as an interim 
alternative. Only recently it was declared that the ASF is now operational, but this 
does not mean everything is in place and progressing positively.  
Schirch32 believes that someone using the term ‘peace-building’ sees the 
military as an essential component of these missions. Peace-building uses military 
means to identify the roots of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. 
Many militaries operate mainly on the basis of national interests, which are 
frequently not in accordance with human rights and values that guide peace-
building, since military personnel get trapped trying to fulfil multiple opposing 
goals, such as successfully securing democracy in the DRC and South Sudan. They 
also acquire access to oil and economic contracts for rebuilding.  
Participating militaries facilitate the political, economic and social 
transformation from a war-torn society to one seeking long-term peace. The mere 
existence of military forces may deter the return to violence, while troops engage 
in active rebuilding tasks. When external forces withdraw, local militaries have to 
continue offering security tasks to prevent inadequate security sector reform.33 
Training requirements for military personnel 
Conventional military doctrine and training address asymmetric, 
unconventional peace missions and peace-building inadequately. Peacekeepers are 
not provided with the unique range of asymmetric and humanitarian skills required 
for the diverse, complex challenges to be met in national military training. Some 
nations are wary of the negative effect peace-building might have on the combat 
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readiness of their troops, but emphasise that peace-building missions do offer 
unique opportunities for peacekeepers in diverse in-theatre environments, 
generating useful skills even for conventional warfare.34 According to Heitman,35 
training programmes need to be sustained to ensure conventional and asymmetric 
warfare training, otherwise troops will be insufficiently trained and ill-equipped, as 
weaponry will be unusable and force infrastructure destroyed. Distinct structures 
should be provided to address all stages from early warning to conflict prevention, 
interventions and peace-building. Implementation remains challenging, but if a 
logical, clear foundation for operations exists, challenges may be overcome in 
African armed forces. Therefore, mission-specific training is deemed to be the 
most appropriate, for example, in the SANDF, to counteract diverse challenges in 
unconventional missions.  
Appropriate training and conversion to civil control are needed, enhancing 
the capacity for contributing to peace legitimately.36 In places like South Sudan, 
the DRC, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Burundi, the issue is complex, 
since solutions to ethnic and religious conflicts require robust diplomacy between 
governments, international supporters and detractors. Instant peacekeeping is 
needed to protect refugee communities and internally displaced people from more 
attacks; yet, some peacekeepers do not have good track records of respecting 
human rights. There is extensive evidence that rather than protecting refugees, they 
have committed sexual offences against women in Sierra Leone, Burundi, the DRC 
and the CAR. Peace-building is a process of building relationships and institutions 
that support peaceful conflict transformation. Exit strategies should be planned 
well to ensure that peacekeepers stay the duration of the mission to complete all 
aspects of peace-building. Logistic weaknesses of low serviceability of vehicles, 
insufficient airlift support for rapid deployment of troops, inadequate medical 
support, and insufficient force readiness hamper peace-building efforts.  
According to Williams,37 the number of UN peacekeepers was then the 
highest ever, with nearly 110 000 uniformed soldiers deployed worldwide, mostly 
in Africa. However, the status quo is unsustainable; unrealistic mandates, weak 
personnel, hostile host governments and mission creep have weakened peace 
operations. Until 2015, the USA trained over 250 000 African peacekeepers and 
paid nearly $1 billion to support peacekeeping activities. However, these 
programmes provided a “broad rather than deep approach to training African 
peacekeepers” while not “encouraging African contributors to become self-
sufficient”.38 It is suggested that the focus of assistance programmes be shifted 
from training and equipping peacekeepers to building sustainable national 
peacekeeping institutions.  
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Goals and challenges of peace-building missions  
External militaries and actors are tasked with two important goals: pointing 
security sector reform in the right direction during their presence in the conflict 
area and ensuring that local militaries and actors are capably trained and equipped 
to continue peace-building. Simultaneously, internal militaries must collaborate 
with external security agents and provide visible results; otherwise, external actors 
may lose interest and withdraw political and financial backing. Important 
difficulties in this process are that internal elites are often not interested in 
transparency, accountability and legitimacy, while external actors are often not 
interested in long-term commitment. In African peace missions, like the United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUSCO), civilians and the military seldom participate well. This 
implies continuous re-evaluation of tasks in peace-building operations. 39  Most 
goals are interrelated and part of post-conflict settlements and mandates; thus, 
transparency of the security sector must be reinforced and regional confidence-
building devices be endorsed by launching strong sub-regional organisations, 
conflict prevention, mediation and resolution techniques, including civil society in 
regional dialogues and development. Both sub-regional organisations, SADC and 
ECOWAS, have created conflict management structures to manage peace-building 
missions and goals for more holistic approaches.40 
As mainly non-military actors provide political, economic and social 
assistance, military actors must respect the ‘do no harm’ principle; that is, avoid 
making things worse than they already are. The military provides internal security 
to facilitate economic and political regulation (the return of refugees or preparation 
for elections). It disarms warring parties and neutralises belligerents who threaten 
to rekindle war and intergroup hatred. External militaries secure the post-conflict 
environment, assist in reforming the security sector and contribute to 
reconstruction. These are the main goals of the military’s post-conflict activities, 
which are addressed with the consent of a reform-oriented government.41 
After withdrawing external military forces and donor organisations from 
conflict areas, security sector policy must be implemented and upheld by local 
actors to guarantee its functioning beyond the presence of foreign assistance. The 
goals of political, economic, legal, social and security sector reform must be 
strengthened in post-conflict societies to enable civilian expertise in defence, 
justice and internal ministries to launch independent audit offices, civilian review 
boards for police forces, penal institutions and parliamentary committees and civil 
control of militaries, policing and internal affairs. Respect for fundamental human 
and legal rights must be promoted and guaranteed.  
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Most military forces in advanced democracies – not necessarily including 
African militaries – are themselves in a process of organisational change, 
becoming postmodern militaries, which is an ideal-typical developmental construct 
developed by Moskos.42 These military forces are categorised by six challenges.  
 The traditional values of honour and of defending the homeland/country 
are increasingly challenged by universal values such as freedom, 
democracy and justice.  
 Although fighting abilities remain important, other humanitarian tasks or 
so-called ‘missions other than war’ are gaining relevance. Postmodern 
soldiers are expert warriors and also humanitarian peacekeepers, 
policemen, diplomats and social workers.  
 Mounting pressure exists for international (UN/AU) authorisation of 
external intervention in peacekeeping and peace-building, which is 
irregular in the traditional sense.  
 The military is steadily becoming multinational, such as NATO’s (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization) Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, Eurocorps, 
the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade and the FIB in the DRC.  
 A long-term organisational change in military affairs is guiding irregular 
warfare and intervention.  
 Postmodern soldiers are met with growing privatisation of violence and 
the imminent security predicament this produces in society.  
This ideal-typical development construct of organisational changes and challenges 
can be suitably applied to the SANDF peacekeeping and peace-building efforts.43 
SANDF Peace-Building as a SADC Member  
South Africa has participated in peace missions in Africa since 1999. Its 
efforts to establish peace and stability and to strengthen democracy and economic 
development are central to its foreign policy. It is crucial to prevent the spill-over 
of intrastate wars across national borders through conflict resolution, peacekeeping 
and peace-building. As an SADC member, South Africa plays a role in peace and 
security issues, but the SADC currently has limited capacity to implement peace-
building, as the capacity lies with individual member states.  
The DRC peacekeeping mission is the largest, most expensive in UN 
history, costing billions of dollars and more than 20 000 troops at one stage, while 
40 nations participated in 2009. The SANDF contributed to several DRC missions 
and facilitated peace-building to effect conflict transformation. The roles and 
functions of the SANDF changed drastically from those of warriors to those of 
peacekeepers in humanitarian missions, depending on the mandate. At least three 
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main phases can be identified in a mission: intervention, when the main work is 
done by the militaries; reconstruction, with shared responsibilities; and rebuilding, 
which should be managed to a large extent by civilian organisations. Political 
legitimacy and cost-effectiveness are the most vital benefits of multinational 
forces. The operational effectiveness of military forces has nevertheless long been 
a contentious issue, and there is wide consensus on possible sources of inefficiency 
in joint operations.44 
The actual experiences of peacekeepers in Burundi, the DRC and Sudan 
were researched by Heinecken and Ferreira. 45  It was reported by 94 SANDF 
members interviewed after returning from peacekeeping that missions were 
complex, vicious and protracted. This placed heavy demands on them, since the 
conditions under which they had to serve were difficult and resources available to 
them were inadequate. Experiences were analysed according to – 
 operational experiences;  
 the challenges posed by the rules of engagement;  
 shortcomings in their training and education;  
 readiness; 
 interactions with other role players, such as local armies in the 
operational area.  
The findings described a real sense of how challenging, stressful and also 
gratifying missions were and what needed to be done to improve the contribution 
by South Africa as a leading nation in Africa. Issues could be seen as lessons learnt 
and shortcomings in terms of cohesion, cooperation and overall stress of 
peacekeepers. More attention is suggested in terms of inter-agency cooperation, 
which could improve effectiveness of peacekeepers.46  
The challenges of PCRD are daunting, especially when the DRC, CAR, 
Sudan and Burundi are plunged into ethnic and religious violence once again after 
being peaceful for a while. As the intensity of intrastate conflict increased in 
Africa, RECs became significant role players in implementing PCRD. The SADC, 
based in Gaborone, is the REC in sub-Saharan Africa that has mainly dealt with 
peace and security matters in the region.47 However, its PCRD undertakings have 
been restricted, since the SADC defines peace and security as state-centric, even 
though it is intended to promote security in the broader sense, including human 
security.48 Human security relates to “freedom from fear and want”, which is not 
yet the focus of the SADC. Its conception of peace and security is based on 
prevention and peacekeeping, but not much is said on activities taking place after 
conflict has ended to improve human security. The perception of the SADC’s 
early-warning system is based on a state-centric mechanism. Thus, its peace-
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building approach is reactive and relates to the traditional conception of security 
and sovereignty, as opposed to human security. The SADC chooses mediation over 
intervention, and canvasses for elections but does not follow up with peace-
building and PCRD efforts. This approach to conflict will certainly not lead to 
enduring solutions, since it does not allow scope to address the root causes of 
conflict. Moreover, the push for elections often triggers new conflict, while the 
disposition to security was completely disturbed when SADC members intervened 
militarily in the DRC FIB in 2013 against M23 rebels in eastern DRC. This was an 
exceptional case, but the reason could be that many SADC member states have 
business interests in the DRC. 49  This controversial action is opposed to the 
conception of SADC policy, which does not yet adhere to human security 
principles, and when the AU insists on the implementation of PCRD, it is often met 
with resistance. Lack of implementation is mostly due to constraints in human 
capacity and a highly centralised decision-making structure, which causes delays.50 
To implement peace-building in the SADC eventually, a broader holistic approach 
will have to be adopted to include human security principles emphasising that 
economic, cultural and social development and the security of people and states are 
inextricably linked.51 Conditions must be created for political and socio-economic 
reconstruction of governmental institutions, while the disarmament, 
demobilisation, reinsertion and repatriation (DDRR) of refugees and internally 
displaced people, women, children and the elderly must be implemented. Ensuring 
people’s quality of life must include basic needs, such as healthcare, jobs, 
education and rural development. Elections are monitored to prevent social and 
political upheavals, and to enable the development of democratic institutions of 
member states to facilitate funding for reintegration and reconstruction 
programmes.52  
Ending the conflict burden in Africa 
While peace and prosperity continue to elude Africa five decades after 
independence and constant peacekeeping is necessary, the AU signed a solemn 
declaration in 2013 to mark the 50th anniversary of the formation of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to end the conflict burden and to work for 
peace and prosperity.53 The goals of the declaration are to rid Africa of violent 
conflicts, human rights violations and humanitarian disasters, and to prevent 
genocide. More ambitiously, leaders pledged not to bequeath the burden of 
conflicts to the next generation and to end wars and “silencing the guns” on the 
continent by 2020, indicating the aspiration for a peaceful and secure Africa as the 
most crucial priority, while proactive prevention of intrastate conflict rather than 
reactive intervention is suggested. The declaration is part of the AU’s Agenda 2063 
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vision, entitled “The Africa We Want”.54 This envisions an integrated, affluent and 
peaceful Africa, governed by its own citizens and representing a dynamic armed 
force in the international arena. The deadline for silencing the guns of belligerents 
and militaries in intrastate wars, is only three years away. Turmoil, insecurity and 
instability prevail mostly in South Sudan, the CAR and the DRC where SANDF 
peacekeepers are participating in diverse roles and tasks. A SANDF paratrooper, 
Busi Mokhothu, died in December 2016 during protests by Mai-Mai rebels to 
reinstate President Kabila for another term, ignoring the so-called ‘democratic 
system’. According to Jakkie Cilliers55 of the Institute for Security Studies, it was 
proved in West Africa and Burundi in December 2016 that the AU does not 
respond when democracy and civil control are abused. African leaders pretend to 
support democracy, but it remains an illusion, and in the DRC, a stalemate is 
foreseen where nobody will progress with the implementation of the peace 
agreement. 56  Only time will tell whether this goal can be attained, but the 
relationship between the military and the politics of conflict transformation needs 
to be sustained. 
SANDF readiness  
For South Africa as a perceived leader in Africa, bolstering its peace and 
security efforts in the DRC, the CAR, Burundi and Sudan makes moral, political 
and economic sense. It can help bring an end to the massive loss of life. However, 
in the DRC and Sudan, force readiness is lacking, while ill-disciplined troops and 
standard training correlate poorly with government’s political ambitions to 
contribute significantly to peace-building efforts. Budget cuts and overstretched 
resources cause low levels of operational readiness, while financial issues are 
reportedly problematic. When the UN reimburses the SANDF for peacekeeping 
missions, the funds are not allocated to the Defence account, but to the Ministry of 
Finance. The capability of the SANDF for socio-economic development is 
questionable. The force is in a critical state of decline, facing numerous problems 
including high HIV/Aids infection rates, skills and equipment shortages, block 
obsolescence and unaffordability of many of its main operating systems, 
disorderliness and an ageing force, which is being rationalised. The army has 
limited capacity to assist South Africa’s own development and growth 
meaningfully, let alone PCRD in Africa. While PCRD occurs together with 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the inability to meet current standing 
defence commitments exists as skilled staff have left the SANDF and only a few 
experienced personnel are guiding the rest who have restricted or no combat 
experience. The current balance of expenditure between personnel, operating and 
capital is both severely disjointed and institutionally crippling. Junior personnel are 
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appointed far above their abilities.57 If South Africa is to be taken seriously, the 
country has to deploy in regional missions to prove its leadership role on the 
continent, such as being a SADC member, which militarily supports post-conflict 
transformation efforts. 
Although the SANDF has serious internal challenges, it has a notable track 
record in conflict resolution. South Africa only has a few staff members in the 
SADC and it may be useful to increase its representation without this being 
regarded as a form of unilateral interference and dominance. Some SADC 
members perceive South Africa as the “regional hegemon and label whatever 
actions it takes as unilateral bullying”, 58  while the inaction by the country is 
regarded as failure to fulfil responsibilities, which also serves as an excuse not to 
do more. This is a conundrum to which South Africa must respond by direct 
communication of its intentions regarding PCRD. The SADC should be prioritised 
and recommended as the implementer of PCRD in African post-conflict states 
through SANDF assistance.59 
Conclusion 
The focus of this article was on evaluating the role and place of military 
forces in post-conflict transformation in African peace-building activities by 
contributing to PCRD, security sector reform, diverse training requirements, goals 
and challenges in post-conflict societies, South Africa’s involvement as a SADC 
member, ending the conflict burden and the SANDF’s readiness. 
Military forces play a crucial role in the long-term success of political, 
economic and cultural rebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies, while charged 
with the task of providing a security environment conducive to rebuilding war-torn 
societies. Post-conflict transformation and peace-building are complex, multi-
dimensional political processes seeking eventual peace. Security sector reform 
contributes to peace-building, focusing on military contributions and civilian 
partners in military peace operations. The more South Africa, by way of SANDF 
peacekeepers, proves that it is genuinely committed to the SADC, the more it will 
be able to implement peace-building and PCRD.60 The link between security and 
development is important, but the fact that violence is again experienced in the 
DRC, the CAR and South Sudan signifies the ability of those holding 
(undemocratic) power to violate the rights of local individuals with impunity. 
Military peace-building efforts are seen as of limited use if they cannot bring about 
radical restructuring of political and economic power and enable individuals in 
Africa to exercise these rights. Politically, the AU system should complete the 
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UN’s efforts by having appropriate exit strategies for the mission to build 
institutional capacity in the integration of core structures.  
Post-conflict peace-building requires unconventional military training to 
supply the full range of military and humanitarian skills to meet diverse roles and 
complex challenges presented in African peace-building missions. Despite good 
intentions, the general opinion is that the SANDF is trained mission-specifically, 
but does not have all-inclusive peace-building training and is ill-equipped with 
weaponry and logistic support.  
Peace-building missions now require specific tasks from militaries, 
depending on mandates:  
 Stabilise conflict states after ceasefires to reach an enduring peace 
agreement;  
 Deploy to prevent new outbreaks of war after peace accords have been 
signed;  
 Assist in implementing all-inclusive peace accords;  
 Assist in wide-ranging security sector reform, restore law and judicial 
processes;  
 Observe and advise on human rights and international humanitarian law;  
 Interact with host nations, internal and external militaries, donor 
agencies, NGOs and regional organisations;  
 Protect citizens and internally displaced people, mostly women and 
children;  
 Endorse human security principles, confidence-building measures and 
power-sharing arrangements; and 
 Guide states and governments through post-conflict transition to stability 
based on democratic principles, civil control, good governance and 
economic growth. 
South Africa’s willingness to be regarded as a leading African nation could 
be outrunning its military capacity, although politically it seems to be exerting 
power in the AU with Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as the retiring chairperson. 
Limited success in peace-building is reported and post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts are inadequate. For local elites, reconstruction is the extension of war and 
competition for resources by new means. Thus, their strategies are often hostile to 
the building of strong public institutions, which hampers successful peace-building 
in Africa. Challenges remain, and it is debatable whether the AU will attain a 
‘silent gun’ reality by 2020. Militaries play political roles in peace negotiations, 
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